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Fighting America’s Best-Selling 
Product:  An Analysis of and Solution to 
the Opioid Crisis 
Ashley Duckworth* 
Abstract 
Deaths from drug overdoses have doubled over the last ten 
years and are now the leading cause of accidental death in the 
United States. Although some overdoses may have involved more 
than one drug, prescription and/or illicit opioids were involved in 
many of these drug overdose fatalities. The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), and Congress have enacted a string of regulations, statutes, 
and programs since the early 1990s, but nothing has seriously 
improved the opioid epidemic as it stands. If anything, the use of 
opioids has persisted. Many people want pharmaceutical 
companies to be held responsible, and although the companies can 
be portrayed as the most at fault, they are not the only ones to blame. 
Medical doctors have also contributed significantly to the opioid 
crisis by prescribing large amounts of opioid painkillers to patients 
when a smaller amount or lower dosage is adequate. The 
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and doctors is the 
root of the problem. The two have worked in tandem, perpetuating 
the crisis. Although the opioid crisis itself is a matter of enormous 
magnitude, this Note proposes that more intensive, yet reasonable, 
federal action through the construction of a civil model law is 
needed. A federal model law would include concepts like more 
actively monitoring the distributorship of pharmaceutical 
companies, regulating doctors’ prescribing habits, implementing a 
tax or licensing fee against pharmaceutical companies, and making 
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a more concerted effort to end prescription opioid addiction while 
at the same time recognizing that there are individuals who need 
opioids to manage their pain. 
Part II of this Note provides a history of opioid use in the 
United States, including background on the three periods of 
increased opioid use, and provides examples of states that are most 
affected. Part III analyzes regulations and statutes put in place 
since the beginning of the current crisis and their overall failure to 
remedy the crisis. Part III also evaluates the effectiveness of 
regulations and statutes currently in place and acknowledges 
proposed regulations and statutes. Part IV looks at the relationship 
between pharmaceutical companies and doctors and explains how 
these two groups create and control the availability of opioid 
painkillers. Part V suggests remedying the opioid crisis with a more 
constructive, yet intensive, federal model law encouraging doctors 
to stop the extreme prescription of opioid painkillers while 
simultaneously holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for 
their actions. 
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I. Introduction 
Driving through a small town in East Tennessee looks much 
different than it did just twenty years ago.1 The landscape was 
once a rural area, dotted with small farms and neighborhoods.2 
Now, the hillsides are littered with abandoned or ragged-out 
trailers and crack houses.3 The living conditions are stomach-
churning.4 What was once a population composed of farmers, 
                                                                                                     
 1. Compare Farming Heritage, TENN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.tn.gov/agriculture/farms/heritage.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) 
(describing Tennessee’s farming heritage and decline in farmland) 
[https://perma.cc/7F5L-9FME], with Chris Salvemini, Transportation Structure 
of East Tenn. Makes Region Drug Trafficking Hub, UT DAILY BEACON (Jan. 23, 
2015), http://www.utdailybeacon.com/news/transportation-structure-of-east-
tenn-makes-region-drug-trafficking-hub/article_b7b87651-328a-540e-b4c4-
c965e8cdc034.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing drug houses in 
Tennessee) [https://perma.cc/G5X8-PLJH].  
 2. See Tennessee—Rural Definitions: State-Level Maps, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/53180/25597_TN.pdf?v=0 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (showing maps that label parts of East Tennessee as 
rural) [https://perma.cc/H4NN-V739].  
 3. See Salvemini, supra note 1 (explaining how East Tennessee has recently 
seen an influx of drugs). 
 4. See Tim Craig, Homeless Deaths Surge, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/04/13/feature/surge-in-
homeless-deaths-linked-to-opioids-extreme-weather-soaring-housing-cost/ (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the deplorable living conditions that those who 
have fallen victim to opioid abuse endure) [https://perma.cc/QNS4-56C3].  
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factory workers, and professionals is now a population subject to 
lost hope and drug addiction.5 
More than 72,000 Americans died from drug overdoses in 
2017.6 Deaths from drug overdoses have doubled over the last ten 
years, and are now the leading cause of accidental death in the 
United States.7 Although some overdoses may have involved more 
than one drug, “prescription and/or illicit opioids were involved in 
66.4% (42,249) of these drug overdose fatalities.”8 Pharmaceutical 
companies are often blamed for exacerbating the crisis because 
they have encouraged the use of prescription opioids and 
advertised the “non-addictive” nature of the drugs since the 1990s.9 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), and Congress have enacted a string 
of regulations, statutes, and programs since the early 1990s, but 
nothing has seriously improved the opioid epidemic as it stands.10 
If anything, the use of opioids has persisted.11 “In 2017, 17.4% of 
the U.S. population received one or more opioid prescriptions,” 
averaging 3.4 prescriptions per person.12 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Clay Duda, On the Front Lines of Knoxville’s Battle Against Opiate 
Addiction, KNOXVILLE MERCURY (June 1, 2016), 
http://www.knoxmercury.com/2016/06/01/front-lines-knoxvilles-battle-opiate-
addiction/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing many individuals in East 
Tennessee being addicted to opiates) [https://perma.cc/7M8W-5N8A]. 
 6. See Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Overdose Death Rates, DRUGABUSE.GOV, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates 
(last updated Jan. 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the disturbing 
statistics behind the opioid crisis) [https://perma.cc/4HR4-W4SB]. 
 7. See id. (noting the stark increase in opioid related deaths). 
 8. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, 2018 ANNUAL 
SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES 7 (2018). 
 9. See Lindsey Liu, Diana N. Pei & Pela Soto, History of the Opioid 
Epidemic: How Did We Get Here?, NAT’L CAP. POISON CTR., 
https://www.poison.org/articles/opioid-epidemic-history-and-prescribing-
patterns-182 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the beginning stages of the 
opioid crisis) [ https://perma.cc/S3CC-YUYY]. 
 10. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID 
EPIDEMIC:  BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF 
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 276–94 (2017) (noting that nothing the government has 
done thus far has significantly helped the state of America’s opioid addiction). 
 11. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, 
at 6 (describing the fact that opioid use and addiction continues to increase). 
 12. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at 
6.  
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Many people want pharmaceutical companies to be held 
responsible, and although the companies can be portrayed as the 
most at fault, they are not the only ones to blame.13 Medical doctors 
have also contributed significantly to the opioid crisis by 
prescribing large amounts of opioid painkillers to patients when a 
smaller amount or lower dosage is adequate.14 In addition to the 
legal instances, the number of doctors who illegally prescribe pain 
medication for profit have also contributed to the epidemic.15  
The relationship between pharmaceutical companies and 
doctors is the root of the problem.16 The two have worked in 
tandem, perpetuating the crisis through pharmaceutical 
companies offering benefits to doctors for prescribing certain 
amounts of opioid painkillers, and doctors reaping the rewards.17 
Although the opioid crisis itself is a matter of enormous 
magnitude, this Note proposes that more intensive, yet reasonable, 
federal action through the construction of a civil model law is 
needed.18 The criminal aspects, although significant to the crisis, 
are not discussed because the illicit behavior contributing to the 
crisis is difficult to regulate.19 A federal model law would include 
                                                                                                     
 13. See City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1062–
64 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (providing a prime example of courts holding pharmaceutical 
companies responsible). 
 14. See Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 6 (describing the contribution 
of doctors to the opioid crisis).  
 15. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Moody Pill Mill Doctor Charged with 
Illegal Prescribing (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndal/pr/moody-
pill-mill-doctor-charged-illegal-prescribing (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) 
[hereinafter Moody Pill Mill Doctor] (referencing one of many instances that the 
DOJ is currently fighting where doctors illegally prescribe opioids for financial 
benefit) [https://perma.cc/2PW2-W67J].  
 16. See Sheryl Calabro, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine:  Placing the Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2256–
57 (2004) (noting that doctors and pharmaceutical companies are both to blame 
for the state of the crisis as opposed to one over the other). 
 17. See id. (describing the relationship between doctors and pharmaceutical 
companies along with the incentives attached to maximizing the sale of opioids). 
 18. See infra Part V (describing the creation of a civil model law and 
potential roadblocks).  
 19. See Trends in Opioid Use, Harms, and Treatment, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458661/ (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (explaining the impact of those involved in the criminal 
justice system on the opioid crisis and suggesting solutions that do not involve 
regulation) [https://perma.cc/Z8CW-L24P]. 
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concepts like more actively monitoring the distributorship of 
pharmaceutical companies, regulating doctors’ prescribing habits, 
implementing a tax or licensing fee against pharmaceutical 
companies, and making a more concerted effort to end prescription 
opioid addiction while at the same time recognizing that there are 
individuals who need opioids to manage their pain.20 
Part II provides a history of opioid use in the United States, 
including background on the three periods of increased opioid use, 
and provides examples of states that are most affected.21 
Part III analyzes regulations and statutes put in place since 
the beginning of the current crisis and their overall failure to 
remedy the crisis.22 Part III also evaluates the effectiveness of 
regulations and statutes currently in place and acknowledges 
proposed regulations and statutes.23 
Part IV looks at the relationship between pharmaceutical 
companies and doctors and explains how these two groups create 
and control the availability of opioid painkillers.24 
Part V suggests remedying the opioid crisis with a more 
constructive, yet intensive, federal model law encouraging doctors 
to stop the extreme prescription of opioid painkillers while 
simultaneously holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for 
their actions.25 
II. Background 
A. History of Opioid Use in the United States 
The final quarter of the twentieth century brought about the 
acceptance of opioids in mainstream medical practice and 
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra Part V (proposing a new federal model law). 
 21. See infra Part II (documenting the history of opioid use in the United 
States).  
 22. See infra Part III (examining regulations, statutes, and their failure to 
remedy the opioid crisis). 
 23. See infra Part III (evaluating proposed statutes and regulations aimed 
at curbing the opioid crisis). 
 24. See infra Part IV (explaining the interplay between doctors and 
pharmaceutical companies as it relates to the prescription of opioids). 
 25. See infra Part V (describing a possible remedy to the opioid crisis). 
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treatment.26 Prior to the 1980s, opioid use was minimal.27 In fact, 
physicians and nurses were trained to give minimal opioids for 
pain, unless death seemed imminent.28 This mindset changed as 
researchers and specialists determined chronic pain was vastly 
undertreated.29 Highly influential articles and studies were 
published in the 1980s reporting on the low incidence of addictive 
behavior.30 These articles claimed there was “no published 
long-term data that gave evidence of high addiction rates among 
pain patients.”31 A large number of doctors, patients, and opioid 
manufacturers supported these results, and within a decade, pain 
management had changed.32 By 1996, the American Society of 
Anesthesiology adopted a new set of guidelines for treating chronic 
pain including recommendations about evaluating patients for 
drug therapies involving opioids.33 At that point, opioids became a 
staple form of pain reliever.34 
                                                                                                     
 26. See Hilary Homenko, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation:  A Prescription 
for the FDA’s Next Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy 
(REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 273, 277–78 (2012) (describing the earlier history of 
opioids in America). 
 27. See Marcia L. Meldrum, The Ongoing Opioid Prescription Epidemic:  
Historical Context, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1365, 1365 (2016) (providing that 
opioid use prior to the introduction of persuasive research articles on their 
non-addictive nature was minimal). 
 28. See id. (emphasizing that opioid use was minimal prior to the 1980s and 
that opioids were only used in emergencies). 
 29. See id. (noting that the introduction of opioid use as a more normal 
treatment for pain was in response to the need to treat pain better). 
 30. See id. (referencing the research articles written in the 1980s telling 
individuals that opioids were safe to use and non-addictive). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. (describing how, after the results supporting opioid use for pain 
treatment were released, the rest of the industry quickly caught up and supported 
opioid use). 
 33. See Homenko, supra note 26, at 277–78 (referring to the guidelines 
established by the late 1990s for assisting patients and doctors with the use of 
opioids and how to do so properly). 
 34. See Homenko, supra note 26, at 277–78 (“Opioid pain relievers commonly 
used today include morphine, hydrocodone, and oxycodone.”). 
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B. The Start of the Crisis 
One way to map the escalation of the opioid crisis is by the 
number of overdose deaths from opioid use.35 As the number of 
deaths increased, the crisis arguably intensified.36 The timeline 
illustrating this can be broken down into three waves.37 “The first 
wave began with the increased prescribing of opioids in the 1990s, 
with overdose deaths involving prescription opioids (natural and 
semi-synthetic opioids and methadone) increasing since 1999.”38 
This was the foundation of the crisis.39 Prescription painkillers 
were prescribed at alarming rates, causing mass dependency 
issues that are still prevalent and increasing today.40 
Reassurances given to prescribers by pharmaceutical companies 
and medical societies claiming that the risk of addiction to 
prescription opioids was very low contributed to increased 
prescription rates.41 Pharmaceutical companies also began 
promoting the use of opioids in patients with non-cancer related 
pain, and by 1999, eighty-six percent of patients using opioids were 
using them for non-cancer pain.42 With the increase in opioid 
usage, communities where opioids were made available and 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Opioid Overdose, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drugover 
dose/data/analysis.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the general 
mapping of the opioid crisis from its start in the 1980s to the 2010s) 
[https://perma.cc/LDQ9-HSLH].  
 36. Id.  
 37. See id. (“This rise in opioid overdose deaths can be outlined in three 
distinct waves.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Kate Vidinsky, Opioid Crisis:  This Doctor’s Street-Level Views Could 
Change the Course of the Epidemic, UNIV. CAL. S.F. (June 12, 2018),  
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2018/06/410636/opioid-crisis-doctors-street-level-
views-could-change-course-epidemic (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“The 
foundational base of the crisis . . . was the prescription painkiller epidemic.”) 
[https://perma.cc/P3M4-8M2H]. 
 40. See id. (“Powerful opiates were prescribed at alarming rates, causing 
mass dependency issues that continue today.”). 
 41. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“The increase in opioid prescriptions 
was influenced by reassurances given to prescribers by pharmaceutical 
companies and medical societies claiming that the risk of addiction to prescription 
opioids was very low.”).  
 42. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“By 1999, 86% of patients using opioids 
were using them for non-cancer pain.”). 
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prescribed generously were the first places to experience increased 
opioid abuse.43 
“The second wave began in 2010, with rapid increases in 
overdose deaths involving heroin.”44 As early efforts to decrease 
opioid prescribing by making them harder to obtain came into 
force, addicts turned to heroin.45 Heroin was a cheaper and more 
widely available illegal opioid that increased in use as prescription 
drug patients and other new users combined into a larger force of 
addicts.46 The increase in heroin usage is evident in statistics as 
overdose deaths due to heroin increased by 286% from 2002 to 
2013.47 Approximately eighty percent of heroin users admitted to 
misusing prescription opioids before turning to heroin, illustrating 
the connection in use.48 
“The third wave began in 2013, with significant increases in 
overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids, particularly those 
involving illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF).”49 The nation is 
currently grappling with this problematic IMF market involving 
heroin, counterfeit pills, opioids, and cocaine, which continues to 
evolve and worsen.50 However, most often, addiction begins with a 
legal prescription for an opioid painkiller.51  
                                                                                                     
 43. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“Communities where opioids were 
readily available and prescribed liberally were the first places to experience 
increased opioid abuse and diversion.”). 
 44. Opioid Overdose, supra note 35. 
 45. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“As early efforts to decrease opioid 
prescribing began to take effect, making prescription opioids harder to obtain, the 
focus turned to heroin, a cheap, widely available, and potent illegal opioid.”). 
 46. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (referencing the increase in usage of 
heroin because they were cheaper and more available than prescription opioids);  
see also Vidinsky, supra note 39 (noting that prescription opioids served as a sort 
of gateway drug to illegal use of illicit drugs that were obtained more cheaply). 
 47. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“Deaths due to heroin-related overdose 
increased by 286% from 2002 to 2013 . . . .”).  
 48. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (“[A]pproximately 80% of heroin users 
admitted to misusing prescription opioids before turning to heroin.”). 
 49. Opioid Overdose, supra note 35. 
 50. See Opioid Overdose, supra note 35 (describing the IMF market). 
 51. See Opioid Overdose, supra note 35 (describing how the mixing of other 
drugs with prescription opioids is a significant proportion of drug overdose 
deaths). 
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C.  Examples of Where the Crisis Is Most Serious 
The opioid crisis is generally more serious in rural and 
impoverished areas.52 The Appalachian region, in particular, has 
higher overdose death rates than the rest of the country.53 There 
is also a correlation between overdose death rates, high rates of 
poverty, and individuals with low rates of educational 
attainment.54 Such characteristics are prevalent in Appalachia.55 
Predictably, compared to the country as a whole, “Appalachian 
residents are 55 percent more likely to die from drug overdoses.”56 
West Virginia and Tennessee offer two instructive examples for 
analysis.57 
West Virginia has the highest drug overdose death rate in the 
nation at fifty-two overdose deaths per 100,000.58 These numbers 
are comprised of both intentional and unintentional drug 
overdoses that reflect a statewide problem.59 The state is “ground 
zero” of the opioid crisis and has been experiencing a public health 
epidemic of drug overdose deaths for more than a decade.60 The 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs:  Overdoses of Prescription 
Opioid Pain Relievers—United States, 1999–2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY REP. 1487, 1487–92 (2011) (“More rural and more impoverished counties 
tend to have higher prescription drug overdose death rates.”). 
 53. See Aaron Payne, CDC Outlines Plan to Address Ohio Valley’s Opioid 
Crisis, W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Mar. 22, 2018), http://www.wvpublic.org/post/cdc-
outlines-plan-address-ohio-valleys-opioid-crisis-0 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) 
(“The Appalachian Region has been taking a disproportionate hit in overdose 
deaths in relation to the rest of the country.”) [https://perma.cc/Y8Q3-6CCU].  
 54. See id. (describing the strong correlation between overdose deaths and 
areas with high rates of poverty, people on disability, and low rates of educational 
attainment). 
 55. See id. (illustrating the characteristics that correlate between opioid 
overdoses and the Appalachian region overlap). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text (describing the opioid crisis 
in West Virginia);  see also infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text (describing 
the opioid crisis in Tennessee).  
 58. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at 
26. 
 59. See W. VA. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES. BUREAU FOR PUB. HEALTH, 
WEST VIRGINIA DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 2001–2015 4 
(2017) (noting that all areas of the state are affected by opioid abuse). 
 60. See United States v. Walker, No. 2:17-cr-00010, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98233, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. June 26, 2017) (explaining the cultural context of the 
opioid crisis and the havoc wreaked on West Virginia). 
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details embedded in the data can be chilling.61 Just one night in 
2016, twenty-six individuals overdosed in Cabell County, West 
Virginia.62 The sheer number of the calls overwhelmed police and 
EMS responders, and although this was an extraordinary case in 
terms of the number of individuals that overdosed, unfortunate 
overdoses happen all too often in West Virginia.63 The opioid crisis 
is even reflected in West Virginia’s case law.64 The epidemic must 
be explained in depth in order for others to grasp the cultural 
context of the area and the fact that the “opioid crisis is a cancer 
that has grown and metastasized in the body politic of the United 
States.”65  
Tennessee provides an alternative example of how the crisis 
has progressed through the Appalachian region.66 In Tennessee, 
the opioid prescribing rate was 94.4 per 100 persons in 2017, the 
third highest in the nation behind Alabama and Arkansas.67 
Moreover, “[i]n 2016, there were 1,186 opioid-related overdose 
deaths in Tennessee—a rate of 18.1 deaths per 100,000 persons—
higher than the national rate of 13.3 deaths per 100,000 persons.”68 
To put this number into perspective, these are more lives than the 
                                                                                                     
 61. See id. (discussing the dire effects the opioid crisis has had on West 
Virginia). 
 62. See Taylor Stuck, 26 Overdoses Reported Monday Evening, HERALD 
DISPATCH (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/overdoses-
reported-monday-evening/article_81990238-4a74-5431-9420-76e0f35c5cbf.html 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (providing a newspaper report on twenty-six 
individuals overdosing in Huntington, West Virginia) [https://perma.cc/Q2JU-
Y3TM].  
 63. See id. (“By 9 p.m., 26 overdoses had been reported, more than Cabell 
County EMS responds to in a week.”). 
 64. See Walker, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98233, at *7 (“The plea agreement 
proffered by the parties in this case was made in the context of a clear, present, 
and deadly heroin and opioid crisis in this community.”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Mandy Pellegrin & Courtnee Melton, The Opioid Epidemic in 
Tennessee:  2018 Update on Indicators of Progress, SYCAMORE INST. (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.sycamoreinstitutetn.org/2018/08/09/opioid-epidemic-tn-indicators/ 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (clarifying that the situation in Tennessee concerning 
the opioid crisis is still worsening) [https://perma.cc/VBN4-5LPS]. 
 67. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, 
at 11 (noting that these numbers may seem distorted but that several individuals 
have multiple prescriptions for opioids, inflating the numbers). 
 68. Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, supra note 6. 
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state lost in combat during the entire Vietnam War.69 To provide 
an alternative example, in July of 2009, members of a Tennessee 
drug task force seized several one-hundred-tablet bottles of 
oxycodone made by the pharmaceutical company Mallinckrodt.70 
Task-force agents alerted Mallinckrodt because the company’s lot 
numbers were printed on the labels, allowing for easy tracking of 
the pills, but rather than taking action to halt the extreme amount 
of opioids being sent to the state, Mallinckrodt continued shipping 
pills knowing that they would more than likely be misused.71 
Although Tennessee as a whole is not the worst case, an afternoon 
observing an East Tennessee criminal courtroom illustrates 
countless cases almost all dealing with drugs, repeat offenders, 
and an obvious problem with opioids.72 
III. Regulations and Their Failure 
A. Current Regulations and Guidelines 
A significant number of statutes and regulations have been 
implemented to combat the crisis.73 However, attempts at 
regulating and lawmaking have proven largely ineffective thus 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Phil Roe, Working Together to Tackle the Opioid Epidemic, 
GREENEVILLE SUN (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.greenevillesun.com/opinion/local_columns/working-together-to-
tackle-the-opioid-epidemic/article_a3809b78-7740-5fcf-9d4c-cfa114951da8.html 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (comparing the death toll from opiates in Tennessee 
with the death toll of soldiers from the state during the Vietnam War) 
[https://perma.cc/4W5B-RLW7]. 
 70. Lenny Bernstein & Scott Higham, Major DEA Opioid Case Falters on 
Uncertain Legal Ground, HERALD NET (Apr. 2, 2017, 5:54 PM), 
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/major-dea-opioid-case-falters-on-uncertain-
legal-ground/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F52U-DRBE]. 
 71. See id. (noting that Mallinckrodt was held accountable for its 
transgressions in a $35 million settlement yet still found itself blameless). 
 72. See Court Responses to the Opioid Epidemic:  Happening Now, CTR. FOR 
CT. INNOVATION, https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/ 
media/documents/2019-07/handout_happeningnow_pageview_07112019.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing a new docket created in Tennessee courts which 
implements new strategies for helping those involved in opioid-related cases) 
[https://perma.cc/2ZFG-CVVN]. 
 73. See infra notes 75–107 (describing several attempts at regulating and 
law-making in an attempt to combat the opioid epidemic). 
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far.74 President Trump issued an executive order in November of 
2017 authorizing the executive branch “to combat the scourge of 
drug abuse, addiction, and overdose (drug addiction), including 
opioid abuse, addiction, and overdose (opioid crisis).”75 This order 
established the President’s Commission on Combating Drug 
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, which is composed of members 
designated or appointed by the President.76 The mission of the 
Commission is “to study the scope and effectiveness of the [f]ederal 
response to drug addiction and the opioid crisis described . . . and 
to make recommendations to the President for improving that 
response.”77 The results from the Committee’s recommendations 
are still developing, and mainly call for better strategized federal 
funding, better agency action, better opioid addiction treatment 
programs, and better education on opioid addiction and the crisis 
itself.78  
In terms of governing statutes and guidelines, the CDC 
recently issued a set of comprehensive guidelines for prescribing 
opioids for chronic pain outside of cancer treatment, palliative 
care, and end-of-life care.79 These guidelines were promulgated in 
an effort to reduce the risk and maximize the benefits of available 
pain treatment options.80 Congress has also made multiple 
findings and declarations regarding controlled substances, with 21 
U.S.C. § 801 serving as a prime example.81 This statute, also 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 
2019) (showing the number of deaths from opioid abuse to be largely flat or 
slightly decreasing since late 2017) [https://perma.cc/4D6N-89E3]. 
 75. Exec. Order No. 13784, 82 Fed. Reg. 16283 (Mar. 29, 2017). 
 76. See id. (providing that the Commission reports to the President on its 
findings in helping to solve the opioid crisis). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND 
THE OPIOID CRISIS (2017) (explaining that previous methods have been ineffective 
and that, in the future, the government needs to focus on better funding and 
strategizing). 
 79. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (providing that non-opioid treatments 
are the preferred first step for treatment of chronic pain, and opioid medications 
should only be added after careful assessment of pain control and followed by 
regular evaluations of their continued need). 
 80. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (providing the reasoning for the CDC 
issuing these guidelines).  
 81. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2018) (providing an example of one of the many 
250 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 237 (2019) 
known as the Controlled Substances Act, establishes that although 
many drugs have a  
useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to 
maintain the health and general welfare of the American 
people . . . the illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, 
and possession and improper use of controlled substances have 
a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general 
welfare of the American people.82 
However, the statute acts as a set of guidelines as opposed to 
laws that put actual limits and repercussions into place.83  
In contrast to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355-1, part of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
prescribes steps to determine whether a drug is safe and how to 
administer it properly to the public, including risk evaluation and 
mitigation strategies.84 The statute “gave the FDA more authority 
to regulate prescription drugs, including prescription pain 
relievers known as opioids.”85  
Another example of a stricter statute is 21 U.S.C. § 333, which 
is also a part of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.86 This 
statute puts into place specific penalties regarding drug market 
violations and is fairly detailed.87 On its face, 21 U.S.C. § 333 
appears to have the potential to be effective in combating the crisis 
because of its penalties for violators.88 However, the latest 
amendments to the statute were made in 2017, and unfortunately, 
not much improvement has been seen since then.89 
                                                                                                     
findings released by Congress regarding opioids and controlled substances). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. (illustrating that the statute itself is mainly a list of looser 
suggestions and guidelines). 
 84. Id. § 355-1. 
 85. Homenko, supra note 26, at 290. 
 86. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2018) (describing specific penalties for failing to 
comply with the Act). 
 87. See id. (explaining that failing to comply results in a fine or 
imprisonment). 
 88. See id. (analyzing the statute as providing effective assistance in ending 
crisis because of the penalties in place). 
 89. See id. (providing that the 2017 amendment only added that “knowingly 
making, selling or dispensing, or holding for sale or dispensing, a counterfeit drug 
shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years or fined in accordance with title 
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There are relatively few administrative regulations that 
govern the conduct of practitioners who prescribe opioids.90 For 
example, 21 C.F.R. 1306.07 states that “a practitioner may 
administer or dispense directly . . . a narcotic drug listed in any 
schedule to a narcotic dependent person for the purpose of 
maintenance or detoxification treatment.”91 However, the 
practitioner must be “separately registered with DEA as a narcotic 
treatment program” and remain “in compliance with DEA 
regulations regarding treatment qualifications, security, records, 
and unsupervised use of the drugs pursuant to the Act.”92 21 C.F.R. 
1306.07 essentially qualifies practitioners to administer opioids for 
the purpose of treating individuals going through withdraw.93 
More treatment and accreditation programs similar to those 
prescribed by 21 C.F.R. 1306.07 are also reinforced by 42 C.F.R. 
8.2.94  
21 C.F.R. 1301.28 establishes that “[n]othing in this section 
shall prohibit a physician who is not specifically registered to 
conduct a narcotic treatment program from administering (but not 
prescribing) narcotic drugs to a person for the purpose of relieving 
acute withdrawal symptoms.”95 However, the regulation only 
allows administering drugs to individuals in this manner “when 
necessary while arrangements are being made for referral for 
treatment.”96 “This section is not intended to impose any 
limitations on a physician or authorized hospital staff to 
administer or dispense narcotic drugs in a hospital to maintain or 
detoxify a person as an incidental adjunct to medical or surgical 
treatment of conditions other than addiction . . . .”97 Overall, 21 
                                                                                                     
18, United States Code, or both.”). 
 90. See infra notes 91–98 (describing the administrative regulations that 
govern the conduct of practitioners who prescribe opioids). 
 91. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 (2005). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. (providing that the main thrust of the regulation deals with 
individuals going through opioid withdrawal as opposed to regulating opioids 
themselves).  
 94. See 42 C.F.R. § 8.2 (2016) (providing a set of definitions regarding 
accreditation and opioid treatment programs). 
 95. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.28 (2018). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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C.F.R. 1301.28 once again authorizes practitioners to administer 
narcotics in order to maintain or detoxify a person.98 With the 
regulations 21 C.F.R. 1306.07 and 21 C.F.R. 1301.28 in mind, there 
are not many federal regulations explicitly describing how to 
regulate opioids beyond when to administer opioids to individuals 
who have overdosed or are going through withdraw.99 The 
regulating itself seems to have been left mostly with the legislature 
and governing statutes.100 
Federal and state enforcement authorities have also devoted a 
considerable amount of resources to prohibiting kickbacks, bribes, 
rebates, and gifts from pharmaceutical companies to doctors.101 
Congress has added onto an anti-kickback statute over the past 
several years, and most recently amended it in 2018, which 
provides:  
Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any 
remuneration (including kickback, bribe or rebate) directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in case or in kind in return for 
referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or 
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part under a [f]ederal 
health care program, or in return for purchasing, leasing, or 
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment 
may be made in whole or in part under a [f]ederal health care 
program shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, 
shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not 
more than ten years or both.102  
However, the statute only applies to services covered by federal or 
state-funded healthcare programs, not to all prescription drugs.103 
                                                                                                     
 98. See id. (illustrating another statute that focuses on regulating the 
administration of drugs in response to an opioid overdose). 
 99. See id. (explaining the exemption from separate registration for 
practitioners dispensing or prescribing drugs specifically for use in maintenance 
or detoxification treatment);  see also 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 (2005) (providing 
guidelines to practitioners for administering narcotics). 
 100. See supra notes 75–88, infra notes 101–104 (describing governing 
statutes and actions by legislatures to regulate opioids). 
 101. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2260 (describing the kickbacks and bribes 
the pharmaceutical companies were providing to doctors that authorities sought 
to eliminate). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2012). 
 103. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2260 (describing to whom and what the 
statute applies and its general shortcomings). 
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Hence, many pharmaceutical companies’ practices that would 
otherwise violate the statute have been permitted without legal 
implication.104  
Congress also recently passed the Eliminating Kickbacks in 
Recovery Act of 2018, which makes it a criminal offense to “solicit 
or receive any remuneration . . . directly or indirectly, in return for 
referring a patient or patronage to a recovery home, clinical 
treatment facility or clinical laboratory.”105 The Act criminalizes 
any offers or payments of kickbacks to “induce a referral of an 
individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility or clinical 
laboratory, or in exchange for an individual using the services of a 
recovery home, clinical treatment facility or clinical laboratory.”106 
Being fairly recently enacted, it remains to be seen whether the 
law will be effective, but it mainly affects the clinical laboratory 
industry and illustrates Congress’s continued efforts to help the 
opioid crisis and root out corruption in the industry.107 
B.  Newly Instated and Proposed Regulations and Guidelines 
Bills are constantly being presented to Congress to hold 
pharmaceutical companies directly accountable for their role in the 
opioid crisis.108 Although a bill that was intended “to hold 
pharmaceutical companies accountable for illegal marketing and 
distribution of opioid products and for their role in creating and 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2260 (illustrating the essential loophole in 
the statute allowing for questionable modes of operation to be used by 
pharmaceutical companies). 
 105. 18 U.S.C. § 220 (2018).  
 106. Id. 
 107. See Edward J. Cyran, New Anti-Kickback Law Targets Opioid Crisis, FOX 
ROTHSCHILD LLP (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://physicianlaw.foxrothschild.com/2018/11/articles/fraud-and-abuse/new-
anti-kickback-law-targets-opioid-crisis/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (discussing 
the impacts of the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 and the fact 
that it mostly affects clinical laboratories) [https://perma.cc/MSY5-YM4G]. 
 108. See Margot Sanger-Katz & Thomas Kaplan, Congress Is Writing Lots of 
Opioid Bills. But Which Ones Will Actually Help?, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/upshot/congress-is-writing-lots-of-opioid-
bills-but-which-ones-will-actually-help.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“If the 
opioid crisis could be solved by the sheer weight of proposed legislation, Congress 
would be able to pat itself on the back.”) [https://perma.cc/T2GP-YXCX].  
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exacerbating the opioid epidemic in the United States” recently 
failed, others are frequently introduced because this is an issue of 
grave national concern.109 House Bill 5782 was intended to amend 
21 U.S.C. § 333 by prohibiting illegal marketing and distribution 
practices with respect to opioids and putting in place a system in 
which violators are penalized for non-compliance.110 The 
implementation of this statute would have meant a harsher stance 
against pharmaceutical companies, and even though it failed, 
others like it will surely follow.111 
With the failure of this bill, another recently took its place.112 
In 2018, the U.S. Senate voted on the Opioid Crisis Package, 
including $50 million “to help state education agencies, school 
districts, and tribal governments increase evidence-based trauma 
support services and mental health care.”113 The bill also allocates 
$20 million in annual funding for state and local governments and 
nonprofits to develop and run residential treatment programs 
along with plans for regulatory fixes.114 These fixes include 
expanding access to treatment for those in Medicaid and blocking 
shipments of opioids.115 Although bills like the Opioid Crisis 
Package are typically applauded as a bipartisan effort, some worry 
that this bill does not go nearly as far as Congress has gone in the 
past to support research and grant funding for epidemics.116 This 
                                                                                                     
 109. H.R. 5782, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 110. See id. (referring to the changes asked for in the Opioid Crisis and 
Accountability Act);  see also 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2018) (setting forth penalties for 
prescription marketing and distribution violations).  
 111. See H.R. 5782 (arguing for a harsher penalty against pharmaceutical 
companies and doctors). 
 112. See Liz Farmer, The Week in Public Finance:  States Intent on Taxing Big 
Pharma over the Opioid Crisis, GOVERNING:  THE STATES & LOCALITIES (Oct. 5, 
2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.governing.com/week-in-finance/gov-taxing-
pharmaceutical-industry-opioid-crisis.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (reporting 
on the Opioid Crisis Package passed by Congress in the fall of 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/4EKF-TPSZ].  
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. (explaining the different elements supported and provided by the 
new act which could prove beneficial in the coming year to helping end the opioid 
crisis). 
 115. See id. (explaining different regulatory fixes aimed at ending the opioid 
crisis). 
 116. See id. (providing the Ryan White Care Act, passed in 1990—which to 
this day allows for billions in treatment and support for people with HIV and 
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brings concern about how serious Congress is about fixing the 
opioid crisis.117  
States are also considering taxation as a way to handle the 
opioid crisis.118 Lawmakers have sought to raise taxes on 
pharmaceutical companies in order to help pay for the cost of the 
opioid crisis while at the same time imposing a vice-like tax on the 
industry.119 A tax like this is comparable to the large amount of 
licensing fees liquor stores have to pay in order to sell alcohol.120 
In theory, the tax would raise millions “in new annual funding for 
abuse prevention and treatment efforts by charging 
pharmaceutical companies a fee for every opioid painkiller they 
sell.”121 However, the possibility of these taxes passing in the 
immediate future looks bleak.122 California, Delaware, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New 
Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont all tried and failed to pass opioid 
taxes in 2018, and although lawmakers in those states said they 
would try again in 2019, the only state where a tax like this had 
passed at the time of the writing of this Note was New York.123 
Even in New York, however, the legislation was placed on hold 
due to a lawsuit filed by the pharmaceutical industry in the 
summer of 2018 and was subsequently struck down by a U.S. 
district court in December of 2018.124 U.S. District Judge 
                                                                                                     
AIDS—as an example). 
 117. Id.  
 118. See id. (reporting on state attempts to hold pharmaceutical companies 
responsible for the opioid crisis by imposing a tax). 
 119. See id. (noting a plan to help the opioid crisis that is steadily growing in 
popularity amongst lawmakers and government officials). 
 120. See id. (“Liquor stores and bars pay thousands of dollars each year for 
the privilege of selling alcohol . . . but drug companies only pay a few hundred 
dollars in licensing fees.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. (describing how heavy lobbying by pharmaceutical companies has 
prevented bills setting a tax for the sale of opioid painkillers). 
 123. See id. (explaining how the tax in New York raises $100 million a year 
for addiction treatment, prevention, and education through a tax on 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors). 
 124. See Sara Randazzo, Federal Judge Strikes Down New York Tax on Opioid 
Industry, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2018, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-strikes-down-new-york-tax-on-opioid-
industry-11545253207 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“A federal judge struck down 
Wednesday a New York law that aimed to collect $600 million from the 
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Katherine Polk Failla called the law “an unconstitutional 
regulatory penalty on the makers and distributors of opioid 
painkillers.”125 Even though she acknowledged the validity of 
trying to legislate a solution to the epidemic, she ruled the law 
unconstitutional based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, which 
prohibits state regulation of interstate commerce.126 
Pharmaceutical companies also continue to assert that 
prescription medications are important and needed by some 
patients, and the proposed laws would make access to the drugs by 
those individuals much more difficult.127 Arguments on behalf of 
pharmaceutical companies along with constitutional arguments 
presented in court make it unlikely that a successful tax initiative 
against pharmaceutical companies will pass anytime soon, but 
they should be kept in mind as more individuals begin to take a 
stand against pharmaceutical companies and more courts take on 
these cases.128 
                                                                                                     
pharmaceutical industry to help combat the opioid crisis.”) 
[https://perma.cc/F9AU-5ZGS];  see also Healthcare Distrib. All. v. Zucker, Nos. 
18 Civ. 6168 (KPF);  18 Civ. 8180 (KPF);  18 Civ. 9830 (KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 213661, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“The OSA is not a tax, but is rather 
a regulatory penalty on opioid manufacturers and distributors.”). 
 125. Randazzo, supra note 124. 
 126. See Randazzo, supra note 124 (“A federal judge struck down Wednesday 
a New York law that aimed to collect $600 million from the pharmaceutical 
industry to help combat the opioid crisis.”);  see also Healthcare Distrib. All., 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213661, at *4 (“[T]he method by which the Act extracts 
payments from opioid manufactures and distributors to redress those concerns 
violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.”);  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (setting forth the Commerce Clause, from which the 
Dormant Commerce Clause is inferred). 
 127. See Farmer, supra note 112 (referring to the PhRMA deputy vice 
president’s statement on making sure the people who needed prescription opioids 
were able to access them). 
 128. See Purdue Pharma Tentatively Settles Thousands of Opioid Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/health/purdue-
pharma-opioids-settlement.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (citing the deal in 
which Purdue settled to pay $3 billion along with various other settlement terms 
in light of their role in the opioid crisis) [https://perma.cc/M3R6-R7RZ];  see also 
Randazzo, supra note 124 (referencing the U.S. district court in Ohio that cleared 
the way for a large group of consolidated opioid tax-related lawsuits to move 
forward over the objections of the defendants).  
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IV. The Pharmaceutical Companies’ Relationship with Doctors 
A. The Pharmaceutical Companies’ Role in the Crisis 
1. Early Contribution 
In the early years of the crisis, “[t]he increase in opioid 
prescriptions was influenced by reassurances given to prescribers 
by pharmaceutical companies and medical societies claiming that 
the risk of addiction to prescription opioids was very low.”129 
Pharmaceutical companies were promoting the use of opioids with 
non-cancer-related pain regardless of the lack of data regarding 
the risks and benefits to these patients.130 By 1999, eighty-six 
percent of patients using opioids were using them for non-cancer-
related pain.131 The introduction of OxyContin by Purdue Pharma 
in 1996 was a landmark event in the early years of the crisis.132 
Shortly after its introduction, the sale of OxyContin skyrocketed.133 
However, the large increase in sales was not without great effort 
on behalf of Purdue Pharma.134 The pharmaceutical company 
relied heavily on an unprecedented and rigorously financed 
promotional and marketing campaign for the new drug.135  
Thousands of doctors were treated to all-expenses-paid pain 
management conferences in resort communities. An additional 
twenty thousand other pain-related educational programs 
sponsored Purdue Pharma between 1996 and 2002 were 
available to doctors free of charge. The company sent out mass 
mailings of promotional materials to physicians and paid 
                                                                                                     
 129. Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9. 
 130. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (describing the pharmaceutical 
companies’ promotion of opioids in the early 1990s based on the relatively little 
research articles released at the time and with little to no actual data). 
 131. See Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9 (providing a timeline on the progression 
of the opioid crisis and possible reason why the opioid crisis progressed). 
 132. See STEPHEN L. FISHER & BARBARA E. SMITH, TRANSFORMING PLACES:  
LESSONS FROM APPALACHIA 199 (2012) (describing the introduction of OxyContin 
to the market and its detrimental effects). 
 133. See id. at 200 (“OxyContin sales accelerated from $48 million in 1996 to 
a blockbuster $1.1 billion in 2000.”). 
 134. See id. at 199–200 (describing the great lengths Purdue Pharma would 
go to in order to advertise and market OxyContin). 
 135. See id. at 200 (describing Purdue Pharma’s marketing techniques for 
OxyContin in great detail). 
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lucrative incentives to its sales representatives. Free starter 
vouchers and coupons for OxyContin were made available for 
doctors to give to their patients. The company provided doctors 
logo-branded OxyContin fishing hats, tote bags, clocks, plush 
stuffed toys, and music compact discs.136 
Early incentives for doctors to prescribe opioids were intense and 
heavily directed at getting physicians to prescribe as many opioid 
painkillers as possible.137 These marketing techniques and 
incentives laid the foundation for the current state of the opioid 
crisis. 
2. Current Contribution 
Currently, pharmaceutical companies do the bare minimum to 
fulfill their legal duty to warn consumers about the dangers of 
prescription drugs by merely providing a warning to the 
prescribing physician.138 By warning physicians, pharmaceutical 
companies decrease their liability and place the duty to actually 
warn the consumer in the hands of the doctor.139 The lack of 
responsibility on behalf of pharmaceutical companies for the large 
amounts of opioids shipped to towns and cities is shocking, 
particularly in today’s world of increased corporate social 
responsibility.140 For example, nine million opioids were shipped to 
a town of only 400 people in West Virginia by a wholesale drug 
company.141 Further, an investigation performed by the House 
                                                                                                     
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. (illustrating that the techniques were used to increase revenue 
and profit margin more than anything). 
 138. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2242–43 (describing the fact that all 
pharmaceutical companies have to do now by law is warn consumers). 
 139. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2243 (explaining that most of the duty to 
enforce limits on opioids ends up falling on the doctors themselves). 
 140. See Klaus M. Leisinger, The Corporate Social Responsibility of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry:  Idealism without Illusion and Realism without 
Resignation, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 577, 577–78 (2005) (referring to the increased 
responsibility that pharmaceutical companies should be taking on in the 
corporate social responsibility realm). 
 141. See 9 Million Painkillers Shipped to Tiny West Virginia Town, MSNBC 
(Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.msnbc.com/all-in/watch/9-million-painkillers-
shipped-to-tiny-west-virginia-town-895420995808 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2019) (describing the large quantity of opioids that flooded into Kermit, W.Va.) 
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Energy and Commerce Committee in West Virginia “revealed that 
20.8 million hydrocodone and oxycodone pills have been delivered 
to Williamson, West Virginia, a town with a community college, a 
rail yard—and fewer than 3200 residents, according to the most 
recent Census figures,” totaling to more than 6500 pills per 
person.142 These two separate instances exemplify an outrageous 
ratio that is not being handled or helped by current legislation or 
regulation, regardless of efforts to remedy the situation. 
Indirect intervention by the pharmaceutical industry through 
lobbying and advocacy groups have pushed back on changes to 
opioid prescribing patterns through “attempts to halt measures to 
restrict opioid overprescribing, efforts to undermine the CDC 
guidelines, and thwarting attempts to hold prescribers and 
pharmaceutical companies accountable.”143 However, legal action 
has been taken against pharmaceutical companies in an attempt 
to hold them accountable for their marketing techniques and 
distribution.144 
A prime example of an attempt to hold pharmaceutical 
companies responsible is the string of cases and settlements with 
Purdue Pharma.145 Although Purdue Pharma was not the only 
pharmaceutical manufacturer distributing opioid products 
containing oxycodone, Purdue Pharma’s OxyContin was a focal 
point in the conversation of opioid addiction.146 The rapid spread of 
opioid abuse captured the attention of local, state, and federal 
government officials in the early years of the epidemic, and by 
                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/Z6FP-F48Q].  
 142. Lindsey Bever, A Town of 3,200 Was Flooded with Nearly 21 Million Pain 
Pills as Addiction Crisis Worsened, Lawmakers Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2018, 
3:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/01/31/ 
a-town-of-3200-was-flooded-with-21-million-pain-pills-as-addiction-crisis-
worsened-lawmakers-say/?utm_term=.0741f5fc5540 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/UCZ9-EZM7]. 
 143. Liu, Pei & Soto, supra note 9. 
 144. See Abby Cunningham, Purpose, Prudence, and Path:  Reevaluating the 
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine in the Context of Opioid Litigation, 9 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. ONLINE J. 1, 31 (2017) (referring to the legal proceedings against Purdue 
Pharma to hold them accountable for essentially fraud and relaying misleading 
information). 
 145. See id. (referring to the multiple allegations and class actions against the 
pharmaceutical company in the 2000s). 
 146. See id. at 29–30 (describing the centrality of Purdue Pharma in the opioid 
addiction conversation). 
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2001, the FDA recognized the problems presented by OxyContin, 
leading it to contact Purdue Pharma about the agency’s 
concerns.147 “The FDA changed OxyContin’s label to include a 
‘black box’ warning of the dangers of the product, the strongest 
warning label available for an FDA regulated product.”148 
Nevertheless, the sale of OxyContin continued to increase due to 
Purdue Pharma’s aggressive marketing strategies.149 “[T]he 
product had earned the company over $2.8 billion in revenue” by 
2001 even with the “negative press and increased governmental 
and regulatory scrutiny.”150 In fact, “OxyContin is estimated to 
have generated revenues in excess of $30 billion since its entry 
onto the market and has been hailed as ‘America’s bestselling 
painkiller.’”151 Individuals were able to start bringing product 
liability lawsuits and domestic class actions against Purdue 
Pharma and other opioid makers beginning in the early 2000s as 
the rate of death from opioids increased.152 Although these 
lawsuits in the early 2000s had little success, with many ending in 
the pleading stage, several settlements in 2019 achieved tangible 
results that are leaving their mark on the pharmaceutical 
industry.153 
The Purdue Pharma settlement of 2007 provided one of the 
first specific examples of holding a pharmaceutical company 
                                                                                                     
 147. See id. at 30 (referring to the early attempt of the FDA to enforce some 
regulations against pharmaceutical companies). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. (noting that the presence of warning labels accomplished virtually 
nothing in terms of deterring the use of OxyContin). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 30–31. 
 152. See id. at 31 (noting the starting point of lawsuits geared at holding 
pharmaceutical companies accountable). 
 153. See id. (stating that these early opioid “lawsuits met with little success, 
ending primarily in the pleading stage”);  see also Jackie Fortier & Brian Mann, 
Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay Oklahoma $572 Million in Opioid Trial, NPR 
(Aug. 26, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2019/08/26/754481268/judge-in-opioid-trial-rules-johnson-johnson-must-
pay-oklahoma-572-million (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (detailing “the first ruling 
to hold a pharmaceutical company responsible for one of the worst drug epidemics 
in American history”) [https://perma.cc/J8XT-TQ5H];  see also Jan Hoffman, 
Purdue Pharma Tentatively Settles Thousands of Opioid Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/health/purdue-pharma-opioids-
settlement.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) 
(detailing the 2019 Purdue settlement) [https://perma.cc/8F3V-LY4L]. 
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accountable.154 The company and three current and former 
executives pled guilty to criminal charges that they misled 
regulators, doctors, and patients about the drug’s risk of addiction 
and its potential for abuse.155 As a result, the company agreed to 
pay $600 million in fines and other payments to resolve all civil 
and criminal charges, the largest amount ever paid by a drug 
company in such a case at the time.156 Allegations against Purdue 
continued following this settlement, arguing that “defendant 
pharmaceutical companies, through a deceptive and unfair 
marketing campaign, reversed the medical understanding of 
opioids so that prescribing opioids to treat chronic pain long-term 
would be commonplace.”157  
Following this settlement and several proceedings, 
pharmaceutical companies in 2019 were held more directly 
accountable than ever before.158 The first of these cases is 
illustrated in the Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson.159 The 
Oklahoma judge in the case ruled that “drugmaker Johnson & 
Johnson helped ignite the state’s opioid crisis by deceptively 
marketing painkillers.”160 Consequently, the company was ordered 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Cunningham, supra note 144, at 30 (providing a solid and more 
renowned case example of plaintiffs attacking pharmaceutical companies for their 
misguidance on opioid usage);  see also Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin 
Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2019) (detailing the 2007 Purdue settlement) [https://perma.cc/FRA4-
HS7L]. 
 155. See Meier, supra note 154 (“The company that makes the narcotic 
painkiller OxyContin and three current and former executives pleaded guilty 
today in federal court here to criminal charges . . . ”). 
 156. See Meier, supra note 154 (“To resolve criminal and civil charges related 
to the drug’s ‘misbranding,’ the parent of Purdue Pharma, the company that 
markets OxyContin, agreed to pay some $600 million in fines and other payments, 
one of the largest amounts ever paid by a drug company in such a case.”). 
 157. City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1062 (N.D. 
Ill. 2016); see also Cunningham, supra note 144, at 30 (explaining the Purdue 
Pharma litigation that followed the initial 2007 settlement). 
 158. See, e.g., Fortier & Mann, supra note 153 (describing a 2019 judgment as 
“the first ruling to hold a pharmaceutical company responsible for one of the worst 
drug epidemics in American history”).  
 159. See Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 
4409690, at *30 (Okla. Aug. 26, 2019) (finding Johnson & Johnson liable). 
 160. Fortier & Mann, supra note 153. 
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to pay $465 million to the state.161 Although Johnson & Johnson 
will appeal the judgment, the ruling was a win for those making 
efforts to hold pharmaceutical companies accountable for their role 
in the opioid crisis.162  
The most recent Purdue Pharma settlement concerning 
thousands of opioid cases is another illustration of holding these 
pharmaceutical companies  accountable.163 The broad scope of the 
settlement includes:  Purdue filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy; the 
creation of a new company to continue selling OxyContin and other 
medicines, the profits of which will be used to pay the plaintiffs 
after the dissolvement of the previous company; the donation of 
drugs for addiction treatment and overdose reversal; and the 
payment of $3 billion over the course of seven years.164 All of this 
being said, the settlement notably does not include any admission 
of wrongdoing.165 It is uncertain at this early stage where courts 
are seen ruling against pharmaceutical companies whether or not 
these rulings and recent settlements will have a lasting or 
permanent impact on discouraging the ever increasing sale of 
opioids.166 The fact that the pharmaceutical companies as a whole 
seem to avoid blame is discouraging, and based on the past, it is 
still unknown whether the companies will be held totally 
                                                                                                     
 161. See Colin Dwyer & Jackie Fortier, Oklahoma Judge Shaves $107 Million 
Off Opioid Decision against Johnson & Johnson, NPR (Nov. 15, 2019, 3:31 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/11/15/779439374/oklahoma-judge-shaves-107-million-
off-opioid-decision-against-johnson-johnson (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) 
(describing how the Oklahoma judge initially ordered a $572 million fine but 
changed the number due to a calculation error) [https://perma.cc/BG2N-L85L]. 
 162. See Fortier & Mann, supra note 153 (explaining that Judge Balkman’s 
ruling affirmed the key legal argument of the state’s case, that the drugmaker 
had created a “public nuisance”). 
 163. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (“Thousands of municipal governments 
nationwide and nearly two dozen states that sued the pharmaceutical industry 
for the destructive opioid crisis have tentatively reached a settlement with 
Purdue Pharma. . . .”); see also In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2019 WL 
3917575, at *83–85, *88 (Ohio Aug. 19, 2019) (providing background and detailing 
involvement in the massive opioid litigation Purdue settled). 
 164. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (detailing the tentative settlement 
agreement which remains to be approved by a bankruptcy judge). 
 165. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (noting that neither the company nor the 
owning family admit any wrong doing in terms of marketing techniques or 
otherwise). 
 166. See Hoffman, supra note 153 (discussing the ambiguities of the Johnson 
& Johnson settlement).  
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accountable by the courts, but the recent settlements do provide 
hope.167 
Regardless of the lawsuits and regulations put in place to keep 
pharmaceutical companies in check, the pharmaceutical industry 
continues to exercise tremendous economic influence over 
physicians and the health care industry.168 Americans spend 
trillions on health care, and this amount seems to constantly be on 
the rise.169 Along with excessive expenses on health care, 
“[p]harmaceutical companies are exerting increasing pressure on 
physicians’ prescription patterns through various means, 
including providing gifts and other benefits for brand loyalty.”170 
The pharmaceutical industry annually spends roughly $12 billion 
promoting and marketing their products to physicians through 
gifting, travel reimbursements, and meal expenses.171 Spending at 
this level could lead to questions regarding the quality of patient 
care if the physician’s financial motives exceed patient needs.172 
Although the kickback programs of the 1990s and early 2000s have 
recently been checked by regulations, the advertisement and 
intense marketing on behalf of the pharmaceutical companies 
continues.173 In fact, doctors who prescribe large amounts of 
opioids still receive large payments from drug makers, according 
to an analysis by CNN and researchers at Harvard University.174 
                                                                                                     
 167. See Fortier & Mann, supra note 153 (citing the fact that Johnson & 
Johnson is appealing and this could be reversed in the future particularly given 
the unusual grounds on which they were found culpable);  see also Hoffman, supra 
note 153 (noting that Purdue still avoids admitting responsibility and that casts 
some doubt over whether the settlement will be approved by the bankruptcy 
judge). 
 168. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2256–57 (referring to the fact that 
pharmaceutical companies still have a strong hold on doctors economically 
regardless of the regulations currently in place). 
 169. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2257 (noting that the healthcare industry 
is a huge money-making industry). 
 170. Calabro, supra note 16, at 2257. 
 171. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2257 (describing the extravagant spending 
of pharmaceutical companies). 
 172. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258 (noting that a conflict of interest can 
easily be created with the physician stuck in a conflict between their duties to 
patients and financial needs). 
 173. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2012) (providing the kickback statute put in 
place to keep financial incentives out of patient care). 
 174. See The More Opioids Doctors Prescribe, the More They Get Paid, HARV. 
T.H. CHAN:  SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-
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B. Doctors’ Role in the Crisis 
1. Bad Habits 
Over the years, doctors have also contributed significantly to 
the crisis.175 Unfortunately, they have done so through both illegal 
and legal methods.176 Doctors have been caught illegally 
prescribing opioid painkillers outside the scope of their 
professional practice for non-medical purposes.177 Illegal 
prescribing methods are not the focus of legislation because illegal 
actions are impossible to regulate at the civil level, and are left to 
the realm of criminal authority.178 Nonetheless, the actions of 
crooked doctors need to be mentioned because of their contribution 
to the opioid crisis.179 
Some doctors have also been found to prescribe very dangerous 
combinations of opioids or large quantities of drugs legally, 
contributing to the crisis.180 For example, individuals are 
                                                                                                     
the-news/opioids-doctors-prescriptions-payments/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) 
(discussing the cycle of doctors prescribing large quantities of opioids and in turn 
making more money) [https://perma.cc/HUJ7-FWBB];  see also Partnership News 
Service Staff, Drug Makers Pay Doctors Who Prescribe Large Amounts of Opioids, 
Analysis Finds, DRUGFREE.ORG (Mar. 15, 2018), https://drugfree.org/learn/drug-
and-alcohol-news/drug-makers-pay-doctors-prescribe-large-amounts-opioids-
analysis-finds/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (“The more opioids doctors prescribe, 
the more money they receive.”) [https://perma.cc/WX2W-98M8]. 
 175. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2256–60 (noting that, in addition to 
pharmaceutical companies, doctors are to blame for drug safety problems).   
 176. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (“Federal 
prosecutors . . . charged a Vestavia Hills physician with illegally prescribing 
controlled substances, including opioid painkillers. . . .”);  see also Kelly K. Dineen 
& James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  Can Physicians Prescribe 
Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J. LAW 
MED. 7, 8 (2016) (describing instances in which physicians may be acting 
negligently in prescribing opioids and not suffer legal consequences because they 
are merely not acting with the appropriate duty of care). 
 177. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (noting that agencies like the 
DOJ are coming for physicians and medical providers who abuse their positions 
and prescribing authority). 
 178. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (“‘Doctors prescribing opioids 
within the bounds of legitimate medicine are not the focus of the Department of 
Justice.’” (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Mohammad Khatib)). 
 179. See Moody Pill Mill Doctor, supra note 15 (noting the connection between 
illegal prescription methods and the opioid crisis).   
 180. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 
8, at 8 (describing the high prescribing rate which has been on the decline since 
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sometimes prescribed both benzodiazepines and opioid drugs 
simultaneously—a common denominator with individuals that 
end up addicted to prescription opioids.181 “In a study of over 
300,000 continuously insured patients receiving opioid 
prescriptions between 2001 and 2013, the percentage of persons 
also prescribed benzodiazepines rose to 17 percent in 2013 from 
nine percent in 2001.”182 The study illustrated that people 
concurrently using both drugs are at a higher risk of visiting the 
emergency department or being admitted to a hospital for a 
drug-related emergency.183 And interestingly, physicians are the 
ones allowing these prescribing rates even with the statistics and 
knowledge that the opioid combination can cause an increased risk 
of drug-related issues.184  
Not only are physicians prescribing dangerous combinations, 
they are also prescribing large quantities of opioids which are 
equally dangerous to the creation of addicts.185 Studies performed 
on emergency room statistics illustrate the problem.186 According 
to the findings of a study from Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public 
Health and Harvard Medical School, “[e]mergency room patients 
treated by physicians who prescribe opioids more often are at 
greater risk for long-term opioid use even after a single 
prescription than those who see less-frequent prescribers.”187 
                                                                                                     
2012 but is still three times higher than it was in 1999). 
 181. See Benzodiazepines and Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates 
(last updated Jan. 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing the common drug 
cocktail prescribed by physicians for pain) [https://perma.cc/D4XV-3JVB].  
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. (noting the increase in risk as a result of the doctors’ drug 
concoction). 
 184. See id. (describing the interesting fact that physicians continue to 
prescribe these dangerous opioid combinations even with the warnings and 
knowledge). 
 185. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, 
at 8 (describing the high prescribing rates of physicians in the United States 
which is still dangerously high). 
 186. See Physicians’ Opioid Prescribing Patterns Linked to Patients’ Risk for 
Long-term Drug Use, HARV. T.H. CHAN:  SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/opioids-addiction-physicians/ 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (basing the findings on accounts from Boston, Mass. 
emergency rooms) [https://perma.cc/59QP-LDXM]. 
 187. Id. 
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However, it is not merely a problem of the emergency room, the 
specific physician a patient sees is equally important.188 For 
example, in the same study conducted by the Harvard T.H. Chan 
School of Public Health and Harvard Medical School,  
[a]though the physicians saw patients with similar complaints, 
they treated them differently. On the low end of the spectrum, 
one quarter of providers gave opioid prescriptions to just 7 
percent of the patients they saw. At the other extreme, the top 
quarter of prescribers gave opioids to 24 percent of their 
patients.189 
However, case law on physician liability for overprescribing 
medication that leads to the development of patient addiction is 
conflicting.190 On one hand, courts have found physicians liable in 
cases where the physician prescribed too much medication.191 
Findings like this may be because the physician did not have 
proper cause to prescribe the amount of opioids that they did, or 
because the physicians failed to conduct a proper investigation.192 
These cases frequently show that the number of pills issued greatly 
exceeded the recommended dosage, or that the prescriptions 
continued to be refilled without a physical examination, leading 
courts to find physicians at fault even though what they were doing 
was in fact legal within the provided statutes and regulations.193 
Cases like these contrast with other courts who found physicians 
not liable because the physicians did not fail to warn the patient 
and therefore did not breach his or her duty to warn.194 
                                                                                                     
 188. See id. (providing other examples of average physicians who also 
arguably over prescribe opioids). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Jack Hubbard et al., Opioid Abuse:  The Fall of a Prince, 21 
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 159, 190 (2018) (providing that the case law on physician 
opioid prescribing has gone both ways). 
 191. See United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 564 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
doctors liable for prescribing too many opioids in a criminal proceeding). 
 192. See Hubbard et al., supra note 190 (“Some courts have found physicians 
liable in cases where the physician prescribed too much medication without 
proper cause or failed to conduct a proper investigation.”). 
 193. See Duarte v. Zachariah, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1652, 1665 (1994) (holding a 
physician liable for negligent over-prescription). 
 194. See Posner v. Walker, 930 So. 2d 659, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that doctor was not liable, even though he failed to warn the patient of 
the dangers of opioid use). 
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2. Recent Improvements 
There have been recent improvements in the healthcare 
industry in terms of clearer guidelines for physicians and fewer 
opioid prescriptions, a change from the previously constant 
increase in prescriptions from year to year.195 For example, 
[h]ealthcare providers wrote 72.4 opioid prescriptions per 100 
persons in 2006. This rate increased annually by 3.0% from 
2006 to 2010, decreased 1.6% annually from 2010 to 2014, and 
continued to decrease annually by 8.2% until 2017, reaching a 
rate of 58.5 prescriptions per 100 persons. This represents an 
overall relative reduction of 19.2% from 2006 to 2017.196  
The reduction in prescriptions per person illustrates improvement, 
but the crisis is still not greatly improving.197 For instance, “[i]n 
2017, 17.4% of the U.S. population received one or more opioid 
prescriptions, with the average person receiving 3.4 
prescriptions.”198 In short, experts still find that the 
overprescribing of opioid painkillers in the late 1990s contributed 
to widespread misuse of the drugs, and regardless of recent 
improvements, “[o]verdose deaths from prescription and 
nonprescription opioids were five times higher in 2016 than in 
1999.”199 
                                                                                                     
 195. See Julie Appleby & Elizabeth Lucas, Doctors Can Change Opioid 
Prescribing Habits, But Progress Comes in Small Doses, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://khn.org/news/doctors-opioid-prescribing-habits-change-
comes-in-small-doses/ (last visited on Nov. 25, 2019) (discussing the 
implementation of guidelines which have decreased the amount of opioids 
prescribed) [https://perma.cc/PA6G-MXUB]. 
 196. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at 
6. 
 197. See CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, 
at 6 (discussing the reduction in opioid prescriptions per person as being 
beneficial to solving the crisis). 
 198. CDC NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 8, at 
6. 
 199. Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Misuse of Prescription Drugs, DRUGABUSE.GOV, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/misuse-prescription-drugs/overview 
(last updated Dec. 2018) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B5FN-
RPJT]. 
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V. Moving Forward 
A. The Creation of a Federal Model Law 
Moving forward, a lobby for reasonable legislation in the form 
of a federal model law is a possible solution to fix the current state 
of the crisis at the civil level.200 Model laws are beneficial tools that 
set national standards and guidelines.201 Each state would need to 
pass the law in order for it to be entirely effective, and in the 
process, states may alter pieces of the act, but regardless, the 
implementation of a federal model law could be the best avenue, 
considering previous legislation and regulations have not been 
completely successful.202 A model law governing the prescription 
opioid industry could involve monitoring the pharmaceutical 
companies, further regulation of physician prescribing methods, 
and perhaps the implementation of a sort of vice tax or at least 
increased licensing requirements for pharmaceutical companies 
while at the same time not greatly affecting the profit margins of 
pharmaceutical companies. 
1. Monitoring the Pharmaceutical Companies 
For starters, it would prove beneficial to do away with 
financial incentives for prescribing opioids.203 A conflict of interest 
                                                                                                     
 200. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 10, at 301 (noting studies that “suggest 
that, despite the existence of various guidelines, pain assessment, and 
reassessment and some other provisions of the guidelines are not always adhered 
to, and . . . pain control can be improved when guidelines are followed”) (citations 
omitted). 
 201. See Legal Info. Inst., Uniform Laws, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (establishing the 
difference between uniform laws and model acts and acknowledging that the goal 
of model acts is reform as opposed to uniformity) [https://perma.cc/WJ5Q-NAEB]. 
 202. See id. (“Those creating model acts contemplate that state legislatures 
may make alterations or even take bits and pieces.”). 
 203. See Charles Orenstein et al., Drug-Company Payments Mirror Doctors’ 
Brand-Name Prescribing, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-company-
payments-mirror-doctors-brand-name-prescribing (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) 
(discussing the conversations between doctors on how there is not much difference 
between name brand and generic drugs but that doctors receive payments for 
prescribing the name brand ones) [https://perma.cc/N459-Y7RF]. 
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can be created when the professional judgment of a physician is 
influenced by a secondary interest such as financial incentives.204 
“A physician has a professional duty to provide for his patients’ 
welfare, yet this duty can be compromised when pressure is 
exerted by pharmaceutical companies,” and although not all 
doctors are influenced by the pharmaceutical companies, this is the 
state of the market.205 More than 83,000 pharmaceutical 
representatives regularly visit physicians, hospitals, and 
pharmacies with intense marketing techniques and reasons why 
the medical professional should use the next big opioid.206 A model 
law keeping these marketing techniques in check could prove 
beneficial in helping the state of the opioid crisis just like other 
model laws, such as the NAIC Model Laws, which focus on 
consumer protection and ensuring at least some uniformity in 
insurance across state lines.207 
Closer regulation of pharmaceutical distributorship is another 
aspect that could be implemented by a model law.208 There is an 
obvious issue with the number of opioids that are shipped to small 
rural towns, as evident by the cases in West Virginia.209 “Primary 
pharmaceutical distributors are solely responsible for the safe and 
efficient distribution of all medications, including controlled 
substances, from drug manufacturers to licensed pharmacies and 
other healthcare providers.”210 Although distributors claim to 
                                                                                                     
 204. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258 (describing conflicts of interest 
created by financial kickbacks provided by the pharmaceutical companies). 
 205. Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258. 
 206. See Calabro, supra note 16, at 2258 (noting that pharmaceutical 
companies are constantly marketing their product with high intensity).  
 207. See NAIC Model Laws, NAIC, 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_naic_ model_laws.htm (last updated Sept. 
26, 2019) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (citing the NAIC Model Laws as an example 
that assists in balancing the needs of the insurance companies and the consumer 
with a strong emphasis on consumer protection) [https://perma.cc/MB37-GBBS]. 
 208. See The Opioid Epidemic:  Are Drug Manufacturers Liable?, NAT’L 
PARALEGAL C., 
https://nationalparalegal.edu/ViewNews.aspx?intTakeOnNewsID=108 (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2019) (noting that regulations “play[] a role in trying to stem the 
opioid crisis”) [https://perma.cc/MG7X-Y8AE]. 
 209. See 9 Million Painkillers Shipped to Tiny West Virginia Town, supra note 
141 (providing an example of significant amounts of opioids shipped to small 
towns where the ratio of opioids to people is shocking). 
 210. The Rest of the Story:  Facts about Pharmaceutical Distributors and the 
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merely fulfill orders from entities licensed by the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and state regulatory 
authorities, the gross proportions of opioids to people, as 
illustrated by the cases in West Virginia, should arguably cause 
the average distributor to pause.211 Regulations keeping 
distributors in check would be beneficial for this reason.212 
Through regulation, the distributors would be held responsible for 
their actions and would not merely be able to hide behind an excuse 
that they were just following orders.213  
Encouraging the pharmaceutical industry to pursue research 
and development of new treatment and medications as opposed to 
the highly addictive opioids is another option for helping the 
industry.214 As recently as November 2018, the pharmaceutical 
company AcelRx introduced a potent new opioid painkiller, 
Dsuvia, a 3-millimeter-wide tablet of sufentanil.215 The drug was 
introduced to the FDA and then approved despite warnings from 
physicians who say the drug will contribute to the opioid 
epidemic.216 Although the FDA’s approval speaks to its role in the 
                                                                                                     
Opioid Crisis, HEALTHCARE DISTRIBUTION ALLIANCE (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.hda.org/news/facts-about-rx-distributors-and-the-opioid-crisis (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2019) [hereinafter The Rest of the Story] [https://perma.cc/BA2Q-
99Q7]. 
 211. See id. (“Wholesale distributors are not ‘pill mills.’ Distributors fulfill 
orders only from entities licensed by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) and state regulatory authorities.”). 
 212. See The Opioid Epidemic:  Are Drug Manufacturers Liable?, supra note 
208 (referencing the laws and regulations relating to marketing and other 
practices relating to the distribution of opioids, which are regulated but contain 
lot of holes).  
 213. See The Rest of the Story, supra note 210 (noting that some distributors 
argue that they are only fulfilling the orders given to them by licensed physicians 
and that they are not in charge of making medical determinations). 
 214. See Non-Opioid Treatment, AM. SOC’Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, 
https://www.asahq.org/whensecondscount/pain-management/non-opioid-
treatment/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (describing several alternatives to opioids 
for pain relief that are just as successful) [https://perma.cc/63LF-TRPV]. 
 215. See Jake Harper, Despite Warnings, FDA Approves Potent New Opioid 
Painkiller, NPR (Nov. 2, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/11/02/663395669/despite-warnings-fda-approves-potent-new-opioid-
painkiller (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (providing that sufentanil is potent and 
Dsuvia was opposed by many physicians and individuals working against the 
opioid crisis) [https://perma.cc/B9FS-9F8U]. 
 216. See id. (“The Food and Drug Administration has approved a potent new 
opioid painkiller, despite warnings from physician critics. . . .”). 
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crisis as well, many critics believe Dsuvia contributes nothing new 
or unique to the market and is frankly unnecessary.217 In light of 
the introduction of Dsuvia and multiple other prescription pain 
medications flooding the market, discouraging pharmaceutical 
companies from continuing the creation of new opioid painkillers 
in lieu of other options as scientists and researchers discover other 
ways to deal with pain could be another solution to helping end the 
epidemic.218 Nonopioid alternatives to pain relief could be 
encouraged with the FDA’s assistance and the guidance of a model 
law discouraging the further manufacture of highly addictive 
opioid pain medication.219 
2.  Regulating Prescribing Methods of Doctors 
Regulating doctors more clearly concerning dosage and 
duration amounts as opposed to arbitrary guidelines would also 
add a beneficial aspect to the proposed model law.220 Many consider 
doctors’ habits of overprescribing medications to blame.221 By 
placing a portion of the blame on physicians, the burden is not 
completely on the pharmaceutical companies, giving doctors the 
responsibility to know their patients’ needs and treat them 
                                                                                                     
 217. See id. (quoting Dr. Sidney Wolfe, senior adviser to Public Citizen’s 
Health Research Group, as saying that Dsuvia is “not unique at all,” that it was 
not “adequately tested in emergency settings,” and that pain relief from the drug 
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adequately.222 “The subject of guidelines for acute pain 
management currently revolves primarily around use rather than 
dosage or duration.”223 Although dosage guidelines are widely 
available and accepted, opioids prescribed for acute pain 
syndromes are often provided at dosing intervals and durations 
unlikely to yield optimal effects.224 If these guidelines were more 
directed at dosage amounts and duration, while at the same time 
more focused on a unified basis at the federal level through a model 
law, there could be better results.225 Patients’ reliance on opioids 
to manage pain could then be helped as other forms of pain 
management are introduced as opposed to large amounts of 
opioids.226  
A Virginia regulation passed in the fall of 2018 provides 
another framework for the model law to follow regarding the 
regulation of doctors.227 The regulation tightens even further how 
and when a practitioner may prescribe opioids, but does not apply 
to patients receiving pain treatment for cancer, sickle cell, hospice, 
or palliative care.228 By regulating in this manner, the individuals 
who need opioids can access them without a lot regulatory red tape 
while the opioids themselves remain under strict regulation.229 The 
regulation makes it very clear to the medical profession that if 
physicians do not abide by the regulation, then they will not be 
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able to continue to prescribe opioids because their license will be 
revoked.230 Virginia’s regulation could be a useful tool in 
formulating a model law by allowing doctors to treat the patients 
who need opioids while at the same time ensuring doctors are not 
negligently prescribing opioids to those who do not.231 
3. Implementing a Financial Burden to 
Pharmaceutical Companies 
One of the more interesting yet also difficult pieces to 
implement into a model law aimed at curbing the opioid crisis is a 
sort of tax on pharmaceutical companies.232 New York is the only 
state to pass a system like this thus far, but it did not last long.233 
Opioid makers and distributors fought the law because it aimed to 
collect hundreds of millions of dollars from the industry in order to 
help defray costs of the opioid crisis.234  Pharmaceutical companies 
argued in three legal challenges filed in recent months that the 
law, which sought $600 million over six years, was 
unconstitutional.235 The concept behind imposing a tax could prove 
beneficial as billions of dollars in government revenue could be 
generated from the tax to fight addiction and overdose.236 Even 
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though several states have already tried and failed to pass opioid 
taxes, lawmakers in those states say they will try again in 2019, 
and with dozens continuing to sue opioid makers and distributors, 
it is possible pharmaceutical companies could begin to buckle as 
lawmakers crack down.237 More guidance and support could be 
implemented through a federal model law suggesting how to tax or 
increase licensing fees on the industry.238 
4.  Possible Roadblocks 
Unfortunately, there are potential obstacles facing the 
passage of a model law of this magnitude.239 For starters, getting 
past the pharmaceutical lobby and influence in general will be 
difficult.240 Their lobby is very strong and influential when it comes 
to lawmaking as evident by the previous laws and regulations 
Congress has attempted to pass in an effort to handle the opioid 
crisis.241 Difficulty in passing laws regarding the opioid crisis has 
been illustrated in the past as the pharmaceutical company lobby 
is able to funnel millions of dollars into stopping bills that would 
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crack down on regulating the sale and distribution of opioids.242 
“Hundreds of millions of dollars flow to lobbyists and politicians on 
Capitol Hill each year to shape laws and policies that keep drug 
company profits growing.”243 The pharmaceutical industry has 
approximately two lobbyists for every member of Congress and 
spent $152 million on influencing legislation in 2016, according to 
the Center for Responsive Politics, while contributing more than 
$20 million directly to political campaigns in 2015.244 These 
contributions to campaigns are hard to ignore, and are evidence of 
how closely tied the pharmaceutical industry is to Congress 
through their lobby and funding which presents a possible issue in 
passing a model law of the magnitude proposed to keep the 
pharmaceutical industry in check.245 That being said, Senate 
committees and investigative journalists have scrutinized the 
financial associations of opioid manufacturers and patient 
advocacy and professional organizations.246 They recognize the 
major concern that “opposition to regulatory, payment, or clinical 
policies to reduce opioid use may originate from groups that stand 
to lose financially if sales of opioids decline.”247 As a result, most 
find that greater transparency is required concerning the financial 
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relationships between opioid manufacturers and patient and 
professional groups in order to improve the opioid crisis, but the 
reality is that it is hard to compete with financial backing.248 
There also has to be an understanding and acknowledgment 
that some patients need opioids and balancing that with the law.249 
The concern among physicians and public health and pain 
management experts is that laws and regulations designed to 
limit use of prescription narcotics, however well-intentioned, 
are yet another constraint on doctors’ ability to treat patients 
as they think best. Worse, they say, some of the limitations on 
prescribing could result in patients turning to heroin or buying 
the medications on the street. And because heroin in particular 
now is often laced with fentanyl and other synthetic painkillers, 
doing so astronomically increases the risk of death.250 
Concerns regarding pain management are not unfounded.251 Some 
patients need opioid pain killers and the further regulation of 
opioids and pharmaceutical companies could complicate matters in 
getting opioids to those who truly need them.252 PhRMA Deputy 
Vice President Priscilla VanderVeer has expressed her concerns 
that prescription medications such as Vicodin or Oxycodone are 
important treatment for some patients, and that the proposed laws 
would punitively affect those drugs across the board.253 Concerns 
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about affecting individuals who need pain medication is the main 
argument on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, and it has its 
merits, but better regulations and guidelines overall are arguably 
better than no regulation at all.254 The issue is not that opioids 
themselves are bad.255 The issue is that pharmaceutical companies 
and distributors are placing millions of highly addictive opioids in 
the hands of individuals who are being prescribed painkillers at 
high rates with little regulation.256 
VI. Conclusion 
The grip that pharmaceutical companies maintain on society 
is a problem.257 It is arguably the root of the opioid crisis that was 
jumpstarted by the transmission of bad information that opioids 
were non-addictive in the early 1990s.258 The crisis then continued 
to worsen as pharmaceutical companies realized the profit margins 
they stood to gain off of the sale of opioid pain killers and continued 
to ship opioids out by the millions even after the death tolls started 
to rise.259 The pharmaceutical industry continues to stand virtually 
untouchable in terms of statutes and regulations that are seeking 
to protect the American people.260 With their constant involvement 
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in Congress, and money distributed to physicians and campaigns, 
the pharmaceutical companies have made themselves even harder 
to touch in terms of holding them accountable.261 Although recent 
settlements and decisions provide room for optimism, it is still 
uncertain whether these decisions will make an impact on the 
industry as a whole.262 However, hope remains.263 It is possible 
through the implementation of a reasonable, yet stricter, set of 
federal guidelines imposed through the form of a model law 
regulating both pharmaceutical companies and doctors, there 
could be significant improvement in the efforts to end the opioid 
crisis plaguing America.264 
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